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It follows that the original co-patentees have defined rights when
the patent is granted. If the whole interest is assigned by one of them
to one person only, then the share of the monopoly enjoyed by the
original co-owner will be unaffected but if a part only of the subject
matter is assigned, it follows that their rights as originally conferred
will be diminished. Therefore, there is justification for allowing one
co-owner to assign away his interest in the patent, but not a partial
share. This equally applies to assigning the whole subject matter to
more than one person.17 Take for example the case where one co-
owner assigns his interest to two persons. No matter in what pro-
portions each of them take, the original co-patentee's share in the
monopoly will be reduced to one-third. The same argument is applic-
able to licencing.j8 If one of the two co-owners were to grant a
licence, the patent rights would be distributed among three persons.19
CONCLUSION
The Patent Act does not, in any of its terms, either expressly or
by implication preclude one co-owner from assigning either a part
of his share or his whole interest to more than one person or licencing
at his pleasure. In addition, there are no cases which directly reject
the possibility that this may be done.
However, the fundamental concept of a patent requires, in order
that the patent should have its intended effect, that these above-
mentioned restrictions should be imposed.
ROBERT ORD*
RACE AND NATIONALITY RESTRICTIONS IN THE IMMIGRA-
TION ACT: IS A REVISION OVERDUE? Canada's position in a
Commonwealth of Nations embracing Anglo-Saxon as well as Afro-
Asian nations is one of challenge. We have the singular opportunity
to demonstrate that we can adjust to an international society of
multi-racial equals within the Commonwealth and without. In this
time of peril, we must re-assess our immigration policy. It must be
consistent with the ideals to which we profess to adhere, since we
offer these ideals to the emerging nations as alternatives to the
Communist route to national maturity.
17 Dr. Fox suggests that the inherent nature of a patent right would
prohibit one co-owner from dealing with his interest so as to diminish the
share in the monopoly enjoyed by the co-owner.
18 A license prevents that from being unlawful which, but for the license,
would be unlawful.
19 It is suggested, that one co-owner may grant an exclusive licence,
reserving in himself no interest in the patent. In such case, the share of the
monopoly enjoyed by the other co-owner would not be reduced since the
licensee would in effect, be stepping into the shoes of his licensor (co-owner)
for the duration of the period.
*Mr. Ord ds in the Second Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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Our deeds do not match our words. Our immigration policy has
failed to keep abreast of changing conditions in a time of social
upheaval. It continues to harbour racial and national prejudice, secret
quotas, administrative abuses, and lack of effective judicial review.
Major revision is long overdue.
A: ADMISSION TO CANADA
1: Non-immigrants
Our Immigration Act is a hybrid. It does not set out groups of
prohibited persons and then provide for the admission of all others.
It does not set out the persons who shall be admitted and then
exclude alf others. It adopts parts of both these methods by prohi-
biting some categories from entry and by creating other groups from
which prospective applicants may be admitted.
A person may be allowed to enter Canada as a non-immigrant'
if he is a diplomatic or consular officer, representive or official of
another country coming to Canada to carry out his official duties.
Visiting armed forces and their families, tourists, visitors, clergymen
who enter to carry out their calling, people passing through Canada
on their way to another country, students attending Canadian schools,
entertainers, athletes, seasonal workers, members of crews, persons
entering Canada for treatment, persons passing through under guard
and holders of special permits issued by the Minister may also be
allowed to enter.2
However there are categories of persons who are excluded on
specified medical, moral, and social grounds.3 There are other less
definite categories of persons excluded. Wide discretion is given to
the Special Inquiry Officer 4 to exclude any person who in his opinion
is likely to be come a public charge and anyone who is suspected on
reasonable grounds of being likely to engage in drug peddling. Persons
who promote or who are or were members of any organization with
regard to which there are reasonable grounds for believing that it
promotes . . . by force or other means the subversion of democratic
government, institutions or processes, as they are understood in
Canada, may be kept out unless they satisfy the Minister that they
are no longer associated with the organization.5 Adherents to unpopu-
lar political creeds may be easily excluded under pretext of non-com-
pliance with this vaguely worded provision.
IImmigration Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 325, s. 2(s) referring to s. 7(1),(2).
2 Ibid., s. 7.
3 Ibid., s. 5. The category includes morons, psychopaths, prostitutes,
spies, vagrants, chronic alcoholics et al.
4The Special Inquiry Officer has powers under ss. 11(2), (3), 24, 25, 27-29.
5 See Act, s. 5(h), (k), (1), (m).
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Other members of the family accompanying a non-admissible
person may not be admitted, unless in the opinion of the Special
Inquiry Officer, no hardship would be involved by the separation of
the family.6 Persons who are not in the opinion of the officer bona
fide immigrants or non-immigrants are excludible.7
Section 61 of the Immigration Act empowers the Governor-in-
Council to pass regulations concerning other requirements with regard
to the admission of persons to Canada. Regulations may be passed
respecting literacy and medical tests.8 Regulations may prohibit or
limit the admission of persons by reason of (i) nationality, citizenship,
ethnic group, occupation, class or geographical area of origin, (ii)
peculiar customs, habits, modes of life or methods of holding property,
(iii) unsuitability having regard to climate, economic, social, indus-
trial, education, labour, health or other conditions or requirements
existing, temporarily or otherwise in Canada or in the area or country
from or through which such persons come to Canada, or (iv) probable
inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties or
responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after
their admission.9 This section, it is submitted is the most abused
and open to abuse of any in the Act.
Under regulations passed pursuant to these powers, every person
seeking admission other than citizens of the U.S.A.10 must have a
passport of the country of which he is a subject.' The passport shall
carry the visa of a Canadian Immigration Officer or Consular Officer 12
but British Subjects of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Union of South Africa and French and American citizens need no
visa.'3 A medical certificate is necessary to demonstrate that a person
is not among the prohibited classes by reason of physical disability.14
II: Immigrants
No person who would be excluded as a non-immigrant may
land as immigrant.15 Additional barriers, however, are placed in the
way of the proposed immigrant, if he is dumb, blind or otherwise
physically defective.16 One would have thought that, after avoiding
classification into any one of the above categories, the potential
immigrant could land in Canada without further difficulty. This is
6 Ibid., s. 5(o).
7/Ibid., s. 5 (p).
8 Ibid., s. 61 (b).
9 Ibid., s. 61(g).1o P.C. 1956-1410.
1 P.C. 1956-785; Reg. 18(1).
12 P.C. 1956-785; Reg. 18(3).
13 Ibid., Reg. 18(6).
14jIbid., Reg. 18(8) referring to Immigration Act s. 5(a), (b), (c), (s).15 An immigrant is a person who seeks admission to Canada for perma-
ment residence: See Act s. 2(i). Notice that an immigrant "lands" in Canada
rather than merely entering: See Act s. 2(n).1 6 See Act s. 5(c) supra footnote 1. Such a person will not be landed
unless he can support himself or is a member of a family that can give
security that he will not become a public charge.
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not the case. Regulations 20 and 2117 set out further hurdles for
the prospective immigrant Landing is prohibited except where the
person falls within one of the following classes of persons provided
that such person meets the general requirements of the Act and the
regulations made thereunder:
(a) a British subject of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, Union of South Africa, Ireland or a citizen of France or the
United States of America, if such person has sufficient means to main-
tain himself in Canada until he has secured employment.
(b) a citizen of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, or Switzerland.... if he undertakes to come to
Canada for placement under the auspices of the department if the
department has given its approval thereto for establishment in busi-
ness, trade, profession or agriculture. No sponsor is necessary under
this section. It must be noted that whole families are not included
here, but merely the wage-earner who must later apply to sponsor
his family's landing.
(c) a citizen of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey or other Euro-
pean, North American, Central American, or South American country
if he is the husband, wife, son, daughter, brother, sister, grandparent,
or fiance of a Canadian citizen or person legally admitted to Canada
for permanent residence who is residing in Canada and who has
applied for any such person and is in a position to receive and care
for any such person.
(d) citizens of countries other than those mentioned above and
including the above may be landed in similar circumstances except
that relationship to a Canadian citizen is necessary, rather than to
merely a landed immigrant. The degree of relationship is also nar-
rowed to a husband, wife, natural-born child under 21 who is legiti-
mate according to Canadian law, father over 65, and mother over
60 years of age.
(e) by an agreement made with the governments concerned, no
more than 150 citizens of India, 100 from Pakistan, and 50 from
Ceylon may be landed yearly. This number is in addition to those
who can meet the stringent requirements of (d).
III: Effect of Our Admission Policies
It is clearly discernible that racial and national prejudice is
woven into the fabric of our immigration laws. Asians and Africans
will find it nearly impossible to qualify as sponsored immigrants and
are not allowed to enter under the auspices of the Department.'8
Middle-East inhabitants and Latin-Americans will find it slightly less
17P.C. 1956-785. These regulations were passed under the enabling s.61(g).
18Of the 20 foreign immigration offices of Canada, only 2 are not in
Europe-1 is in Hong Kong; I is in New Delhi.
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difficult to qualify for sponsorship. On the other hand, certain
Commonwealth citizens and most Europeans will more easily qualify
for landing.
It is then alleged that there are also preferences for certain
European nationalities expressed by means of "secret quotas". Even
if persons qualify to be sponsored immigrants, only fixed numbers
from each country may be admitted. Nowhere is there any statutory
or regulatory guides on the method of fixing these quotas. In fact,
immigration officials deny their existence. Although it is claimed
that immigrants are selected according to occupational skills they
possess, it is admitted that approximately 30,000 Italians are landed
each year, apparently by coincidence. The provisions with regard
to India, Pakistan and Ceylon, though odiously meagre, are laudable
in their candour, at least.
Too much discretion is left to the officials in the Department.
The Act gives the Minister power to make regulations. This mechan-
ism allows the Department to direct the immigration policy as it
wills. Many of the exclusionary groups are vaguely worded to allow
subjective considerations to enter. Visas, in the last analysis, are
issued only to those whom the officials wish to admit. There is no
way to force the issuance of a visa by mandamus, nor is there any
way of compelling a hearing on Canadian soil to determine whether
a visa will be issued.' 9
The spirit of our immigration policy is well manifested in one
of the early immigration cases, Re Munshi Sing. 20 Singh, a citizen
of India had attempted to land in Canada, but was ordered deported.
Mr. Justice McPhillips in the British Columbia Court of Appeal
agreed -in the Court's decision upholding the order and articulated
what was probably the true basis of the decision as follows:
"...The Hindu race, as well as the Asiatic race in general, are in their
conception of life and society, fundamentally different to the Anglo-Saxon
and Celtic race and European races in general.
Further acquaintance with the subject shews that the better classes of
the Asiatic races are not given to leave their own countries . . . and
those who become immigrants are, without disparagement to them,
undesirables in Canada, where a different civilization exists. The laws of
this country are unsuited to them, and their ways and ideas may well
be a menace to the well-being of the Canadian people.
19 Re lantorono, (1959), 123 C.C.C. 143.20 (1914), 20 B.C.R. 243, at 281, 290, 291, and 292; (1914) 6 W.W.R. 1347,
1379, 1380 and 1381. Singh arrived in Canada with $20 and testified before
the Board of Inquiry, that he had been a farmer in India, and intended to
buy a farm in Canada. In those days the regulations excluded unskilled
labourers and required that Asiatics have $200 with them on landing. He
stated that he had feared being looted on the way, but that he could have$200 sent to him. The only evidence to the contrary was that of the Imnnigra-
tion Inspector, who said that he did not believe Singh, since one could not
buy a farm for $20 and since 90% of the East Indian dmmigrants were
labourers. On these facts the B.C. Court of Appeal upheld the deportation
order without a dissenting voice. McPhillips J.A. said at p. 281 that... "the
facts overwhelmingly prove that the appellant is attempting to land in Can-
ada in plain defiance of the law". (Italics mine).
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... The Parliament of Canada-the nation's Parliament, may well be
said to be safeguarding the people of Canada from an influx which...
might annihilate the nation and change its whole potential complexity,
introduce Oriental ways as against European ways, Eastern civilization
for Western civilization and all the dire results that would naturally flow
therefrom....
In that our fellow British Subjects of the Asiatic race are of different
racial instincts to those of the European race ... in their own interests
their proper place of residence is within the confines of their respective
countries, not in Canada where their customs are not in vogue and their
adhesion to them here only gives rise to disturbances destructive to the
well-being of society....
Better that peoples of non-assimilative-and by nature properly non-
assimilative-races should not come to Canada, but rather, that they
should remain of residence in their country of origin and there do their
share, as they have in the past, in the preservation and development of
the Empire".
Thus Singh, who was obviously not one of "the better classes"
of Indians, was deported for racial reasons in order to protect the
purity of the Anglo-Saxon, Celtic and European strains in our national
make-up.
B: EXPULSION OF ALIENS
I: Who May be Deported
If an alien is within one of the prohibited categories, or after
admission becomes a member of such category, he may be deported.
A person who has acquired a Canadian domicile may be deported
only for subversion, espionage, sabotage and drug peddling.2 The
burden of proving he is not prohibited is on the person seeking
admission. 22
Every person who seeks to enter Canada is presumed to be an
immigrant until he satisfies the Officer that he is not.2
11: Hearing
Where the Immigration Officer is of the opinion that a person
is within one of the prohibited classes of persons he shall report to
the Special Inquiry Officer. He shall cause on inquiry to be held
separate and apart from the public, but in the presence of the person
concerned, wherever practicable. The person concerned may be repre-
sented by counsel at this hearing, at his own expense.24
II: Appeals
In cases of medical disability and where a permit was granted
and revoked, no appeal is allowed. In other cases there is an appeal
to the Minister. He may direct that an Immigration Appeal Board
hear the appeal, but the Minister may review any decision and sup-
plant it by his own. The Minister's decision, and the Board's if not
21 See Act s. 4, s. 5, s. 6.
2 2 Ibid., s. 27(4).
23 Ibid., s. 6.
2 4 Ibid., ss. 23, 24, 25, 27.
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upset by the Minister, is final. 25 No appeal to the Court is provided
for at any stage.
IV: General Board of Immigration Appeals
A General Board of Immigration Appeals has been set up to
deal with appeals from deportation orders.26 It is available only to
those persons who have gained admission, and not to those who are
turned away in the first instance. The Immigration Officer, when
served with the Notice of Appeal, must send it to the Board if it is
within the jurisdiction of the Board.27 It is submitted that this ques-
tion should be decided by the Board itself, and that these words
should be deleted from the regulation to avoid misunderstanding.
Provision is made for the appellant to appear with counsel and to
submit oral or written representations.
A time and place for hearing is fixed by the Board and notice
given to the appellant.28 If at the time fixed written argument has
not been received and the appellant is not present, the Board shall
dispose of the appeal on the material before it and the appellant shall
be deemed to waive all his rights to submit oral or written represen-
tations.29
The appellant who is in custody is required not only to supply
transportation for himself but also for his escort.30 The Board is not
allowed to order costs against the Crown nor can it require Her
Majesty to incur any expenses on behalf of the appellant3 l
This provision could be very easily abused. In a vast country
such as Canada the place of trial can be such that the appellant might
require a great deal of money to be present at the hearing. It should
be provided either that the hearing be held where the appellant
resides or, in the alternative, that transportation be supplied the
appellant to and from the hearing to prevent injustice. It is also
unfair that, in the event of non-appearance at the specified time and
place, all rights to argue are waived. There is no need for such a
harsh penalty for absence.
The Board must give its decision in writing,3 2 however, and this
makes the certiorari remedy loom large in the deportee's arsenal
since errors of law may be more readily visible on the face of the
record.
25 bid., ss. 30, 31.
26 S.O.R. 59-366, Canada Gazette Oct. 14, 1959 at 950.
27 Ibid., Reg. 6.
28 Ibid., Reg. 9.
29 Ibid., Reg. 10.
30 Ibid., Reg. 14.
31Ibid., Reg. 13.
3 2 Ibid, Reg. 12.
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C: JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review may be secured only through the prerogative
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, if the applicant
is in custody.33 On such an application the Court is unable to examine
the sufficiency of the evidence. The Minister, on the other hand
may do so in his review.3
1t must also be noted that Parliament has enacted a privative
clause3 5 which purports to withdraw the power of the Court to review,
quash, reverse, or restrain any decision of deportation. Why officials
acting in excess of jurisdiction or contrary to natural justice or
under manifest error of law should be protected is difficult to com-
prehend. It is pleasing to state that this clause is usually ignored by
the Courts which have created a convenient fiction. Since the official
or board is acting outside the jurisdiction given to him, he will not
come under the aegis of the Act and thus will not be protected by
the privative clause contained in the Act.36
There is a clash of judicial approach and temperament revealed
in the cases. In Masefla v. LangZais,3 7 Mr. Justice Abbott indicated his
views on the problem as follows:
"Immigration to Canada by persons other than Canadian citizens or
those having Canadian domicile is a privilege determined by statute,
regulation or otherwise and is not a matter of rght. In the Immigration
Act, Parliament has set up machinery for the control of Immigration
to this country and for the selection of prospective immigrants. To
accomplish this purpose, very wide discretionary powers are given to
the Governor4n-Council and to the Minister and perhaps it Is necessary
that this should be so. An example of these wide discretionary powers
is found in S. 4... in virtue of which the Minister is given in effect
an absolute discretion to determine who is or who is not a suitable
immigrant".
A person, who first enters Canada as a non-immigrant and later
ceases to be one by forming an intention to permanently reside in
Canada, must report these facts to the Immigration Officer and pre-
sent himself for examination. He is then deemed to be a person
seeking admission to Canada and thus subject to all the requirements
of the Act. He has no higher rights than anyone seeking admission
at a port of entry, and may be deported in the same way as one of
the latter.38
33Arvo Vaaro et aZ v. Rex, [1933] S.C.R. 36 affirming S.C.N.S. In (1932),
5 M.P.R. 151. Persons who advocated overthrow of the government were
ordered deported.
34Ex parte Brent, [1955] O.W.N. 419, O.R. 480; [1956] S.C.R. 318. See
also Masella v. Langlais, [1955] S.C.R. 263; [1955] 4 D.L.R. 346,
35S. 39.
36Attorney-General for Canada v. Brent, [1956] S.C.R. 318; [1955] O.R.
480. See also generally Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing Co.,
[1953] 2 S.C.R. 18; 3 D.L.R. 561; affirming [1952] O.R. 345; 100 C.C.C. 318;
[1952] 2 D.L.R. 302 (Ont. C.A.).
37 [1955] S.C.R. 263 at 281; [1955] 4 D.L.R. 346 at 362-an Italian immi-
grant was ordered deported since his visa was improperly issued to him
abroad, although he does not appear to have been at fault.
38S. 7(3); See Re Mannira (1959), 17 D.L.R. (2d) 482; [1959] O.W.N.
109 (Ont. C.A.)-non-immigrant who wished to remain in Canada was ordered
deported since he lacked a visa and a medical certificate.
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A fugitive criminal has been held unable to acquire a Canadian
domicile and is therefore subject to deportation when found out.
Anyone who enters illegally by means of fraud or false representa-
tions may be deported. The same is true for one who enters legally
but later becomes one of the excluded individuals.3 9
Mere delay while awaiting a passport from the deportee's country
of origin before deporting him thereto did not justify certiorari, even
though the Act did require at that time that the person "shall be
deported forthwith after the granting of the order".40 The Act now
provides for deportation "as soon as practicable".4 ' A deportation
order will not become invalid now on the ground of lapse of time
between its making and execution.42
The rules of criminal law with regard to the requisite exactness
of an indictiment do not apply to complaints under the Act. The
conduct objected to must be made known to the alien with reasonable
certainty, although the date when and the place where the act was
committed need not be stated.43
A deportation order is not necessarily invalidated if one reason
given for expulsion is bad while another proper reason is given in
the same order.44
In these cases, the conduct was held not flagrant enough to
require judicial action. Yet, in other cases, Canadian judges have
utilised certiorari to oversee Department action. In Ex parte Man-
rira,45 Mr Justice Ferguson quashed a deportation order. He stated
that the applicants were governed by the statute and not, by the
various opinions of the Officers. The applicant had lacked a visa
when he tried to remain in Canada after being admitted as a non-
immigrant Ferguson J. rejected the argument that a visa had to be
obtained outside of Canada and said:
"The inquiry . . . became a farce-in ordering the applicant deportedbecause he didn't have that which he was applying so earnestly to get
from the persons empowered to give it to him".46
In Attorney-Genera7 for Canada v. Brent,47 certiorari was granted
on the ground that the Governor-in-Council could not delegate all
the power to make regulations delegated to him in section 61 to the
Immigration Officer.
39 Degridakis v. Reginba~d (1917), 36 D.L.R. 367 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
40Re Janoczca (1932), 40 Man. R. 494; [19321 3 W.W.R. 29; [1933] 1
D.L.R. 123 (Man. C.A.).
41S. 33(1).
42S. 33(2).
43 Arvo Vaaro et aZ v. Rex, supra footnote 33.
44 Bx parte Marigny, [1948] S.C.R. 155 at 160.
45 [1958) O.W.N. 461.
46 Ibid. at 462.
47 [1956] S.C.R. 318; affirming [19551 O.R. 480; 3 D.L.R. 587 (Ont. C.A.).
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Samejima v. The King48 was a case in which a Japanese citizen
was landed on the basis that he would work as a domestic. His
prospective employer, however, had failed in business and after a
hearing Samejima was ordered deported. This order was quashed
because of the vagueness of the complaint. The order was amended
and he was again ordered deported but without allowing him the
luxury of another hearing. The Supreme Court of Canada held that
a quashed order was a nullity and could not be amended. A new com-
plaint had to set out the allegations relied on and another hearing
had to be held in the proper spirit of the Act. Mr. Justice Duff
expressed his disgust at the manner in which the Department acted
as follows:
(I am) "horrified at the thought that the personal liberty of a
British subject should be exposed to the hugger.mugger which, under the
name of legal proceedings, is exemplified by some of the records that
have incidentally been brought to our attention".49
D: CONCLUSIONS
The above outline it is suggested indicates that there are several
areas where revision is long overdue if Canada wants her deeds to
accord with her words.
Section 61(g) and regulations 20 and 21 must be cleansed for
their patent and inexcusable racial and national prejudices. By virtue
of these provisions Asians, Africans and others with coloured pigment
in their skin find it almost impossible to immigrate to Canada. Racial
and national prejudice should find no haven in Canadian statutes.
A man can change his occupation, perhaps, but he cannot change his
place of origin nor his skin pigmentation. Exclusion of immigrants
for these reasons is a denial of the basic precepts of democratic
philosophy. It is obvious hypocrisy to exclude Afro-Asians from
Canada on one hand, and to claim that we adhere to the principle of
equality of all human beings regardless of race, colour and national
origin adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the
other hand.5° It is hypocrisy to smugly sit in judgment on our U.S.A.,
South African and Australian brethren, at least until we have cleaned
our own house.
The phantom quota system should be abolished. The decisions
concerning the numbers of people from each country who will be
allowed to land in Canada are made within the confines of the Depart-
ment by means of secret directives. Despite denials by officials in
the Department, the quota system flourishes. The real control of
policy rests in the administrative branch and is exercised in secret.
National prejudices have further fertile ground in which to thrive,
out of view of most Canadians, but very much in the eye of pros-
48 [1932] S.C.R. 640; [1932] 4 D.L.R. 246; See also Ex Varte Brent, [1955]
O.R. 480 affirmed in [1956] S.C.R. 318; The Court followed Samejima, and
indicated that reasons for deportation must be given by the Officer.
49! hd., at p. 281 D.L.R.50 Resolution 217A (1I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
Dec. 10, 1948; G.A.O.R. III 1, resolutions A/810 Pp. 71-77.
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pective immigrants and their countrymen. This method of discrimi-
nation is especially insidious in that it is latent and unseen except
by the fore-warned observer. If we are to exclude immigrants because
of their nationality there should be full disclosure to the Canadian
people. These provisions, if found necessary, could be in statutory
or published regulation form as is the practice in the U.S.A.5
The vast discretion given to administrative officials must be cur-
tailed. Immigration policy should be governed by explicit law and
not by, what appears to be, whim and caprice. Phrases such as "in
the opinion of" and "upon reasonable grounds for believing" should
not be used in any statute or regulation in an area as emotionally
charged as this one.52 It is almost impossible to attack judicially
with present weapons an exercise of discretion pursuant to such a
wide grant of authority. Subjective considerations are permitted to
enter where objective rules alone should govern. Strict legislative
guidance should be supplied to the officials. Frolics in "hugger-mug-
gery" may thus be avoided. Abuses and injustices must be expected
if Parliament refuses to delineate more definitively the ambit of
administrative operations.
The appeal procedure must be revamped and extended. Although
the General Board of Immigration Appeals is an improvement over
its predecessor, it does not go far enough. It should be available as
an appeal tribunal from all deportation orders. Its operation should
be made convenient for prospective appellants. Appeal rights become
illusory where transportation costs are prohibitive for people of
modest means. The Minister should not be able to summarily vary
or quash the decisions of the Board. A further appeal to the Courts
should be provided as in the U.S.A.53 Preferably, it should be a trial
de novo to allow the Judge to decide the all-important credibility
issue himself. The privative clause should be repealed. Nothing
51 See the Immigration and Nationality Act, Chapter 12, U.S.C. S. 1151
(1958). The statute requires annual proclamations by the President setting
out the quota for each country to be allowed into the U.S.A. the next year.
These figures allow a minimum of 100 people from each of the countries or
areas listed up to 1/6 of 1% of the inhabitants from each of the areas listed
living in the U.S.A. in 1920, with a few exceptions. 87 areas are listed in the
present list; See Proc. 3298 8 U.S.C. Supp. 1 (1959). It should be noted that
any citizens of North, Central, or South America are allowed into the U.S.A.
as non-quota immigrants, as are any children and spouses of U.S. citizens;
see 8 U.S.C. S. 1101 (1958). This has not eliminated racial differentiation, but
at least the quota information is available and bears some rational correla-
tion to the U.S. population structure.
52These terms do not appear anywhere in the U.S. statute; see especi-
ally 8 U.S.C. Ss. 1182, 1251 (1958).
53 See Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 19, 5 U.S.C. S. 1009 (1958)
where judicial review is provided for from final agency action. In order to
be upheld the test laid down is that the decision must be "substantially sup-
ported by the record as a whole". See Universal Camera Co. v. National
Labour Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1950) for a review of the
test with special reference to the NLRB. See also 8 U.S.C. S. 1252(4) (1954):
"No decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based on reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence".
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should stop the Court from scrutinizing officials through the expedi-
tious prerogative writs, in addition to appeals on the merits.
The writer does not pretend to have supplied the Immigration
authorities with an all-embracing panacea, but has offered only a
few suggested amendments. Immigration policy is replete with social,
political, emotional and economic problems that resist solution by a
few strokes of the legislative pen. It is submitted, however, that by
adoption of these proposals Canada's immigration policy may be
made to embody the basic tenets of democracy to which we profess
to adhere.
ALLEN M. LINDEN*
SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONTROL OF THE POLICE BY THE
COURTS The powers and duties of the police are not to be found
completely stated in any separate Act. Basically, each municipality
is responsible for maintaining an adequate police force.1 The Criminal
Code, the Police Act, the Liquor Control Act, the Highway Traffic
Act, and various other Acts contain provision empowering the police
to enforce regulations made in them. Section 47 of the Police Act
broadly states that:
"the members of police forces ... are charged with the duty of preserv.
ing the peace ... apprehending offenders .... and aiding in the prose-
cuting of offenders, and have generally all the powers and privileges and
are liable to all the duties and responsibilities that belong to constables".
In carrying out these functions the police are an administrative
body, since, at least in theory, they do not finally determine the guilt
of an accused.2 Every administrative body, to be effective, must be
given sufficient power to carry out its tasks. At the same time, con-
trols must be imposed on such a body to prevent any abuses of the
powers given to it. The police are in such a position that, if they
should exceed their authorized powers, serious injury may result to
an individual.
This note discusses the nature and extent of the power to arrest
and to gather the evidence necessary to prosecute; secondly, the con-
trols our legal system has imposed on the exercise of this power;
and finally, the remedies available to an aggrieved individual.
There are two conflicting interests affected by the power to ar-
rest. An individual has an interest in the freedom of his person. This
*Mr. Linden is a member of the Ontario Bar, currently doing graduate study
in law at the University of California at Berkeley. This paper was prepared
as part of the requirements for a course in International Law at the Osgoode
Hall Law School in 1960.
1 The Police Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 298, s. 2. For the jurisdiction and consti-
tutions of the Ontario Provincial Police, see this Act s. 3, and Part IV.
2As organs of inquiry into crime, administrative bodies have evolved
into judicial bodies. See Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1958).
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